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Abstract. In this paper we study the incidence of specific taxes in the Italian fuel markets, and 
exploit these findings to simulate the effects of fiscal policies aimed at mitigating oil price 
fluctuations. We estimate several reduced-form specifications, using as dependent variables the 
equilibrium wholesale prices for gasoline and motor diesel over the period 1996-2007. In particular, 
we assess the impact on wholesale gasoline and motor diesel prices stemming from the creation of 
an automatic fiscal mechanism consisting of reductions in specific taxes matching the rise in oil 
prices. Our simulations suggest that “flexible” taxation mechanisms could not be a proper policy for 
stabilizing price levels in fuel markets. A more effective control on prices can be obtained by focusing 
on the market structure of these industries, where Antitrust Authority could play a significant role. 
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1. Introduction 
As a reaction to the oil price boom recorded in recent years, consumers' associations 
have suggested (and policy makers have experimented) the introduction of “flexible” 
taxation mechanisms on fuels. First experiences of these policies can be found in 
different countries: in the U.S., a temporary tax moratorium – i.e., a suspension of the 
5% sales tax – was introduced by the Indiana and Illinois governors as a reaction to the 
gasoline price peaks during summer 2000 (Doyle and Samphantharak, 2008). In France, 
the government modified the TIPP, the French specific tax on petroleum products, by 
introducing in 2000 the “TIPP flottante”, i.e. a fiscal mechanism able to change the tax 
in accordance with crude oil price trends. The system was abandoned in 2002 because it 
caused large losses to government revenues. In Italy, two policy interventions were 
proposed in 2007 and 2008, but never implemented. Both of them envisaged some form 
of flexibility in the taxation mechanisms for fuels as a response to oil price peaks (see 
Galeotti and Lanza, 2007). The idea of “flexible” taxation is very simple and easy-to-
understand for consumers: in order to keep (gross) prices at a long-run equilibrium 
level, specific taxes should react one-to-one to observed variations in input prices. 
Indeed, among the various available measures, the sterilization of the increase in oil 
prices by a reduction in specific taxes on fuels seems to be one of the most popular 
actions (as the example of the “TIPP flottante” suggests). However, such a sterilization 
policy should be carefully evaluated, as for the likely impact on consumers, producers, 
and tax revenues. On the one side, if fuel prices are kept constant, there is a welfare 
enhancement for drivers and fuel consumers with respect to a situation of volatile 
prices. On the other side, there is the need for the government to find different sources 
of tax revenues, or to correspondently reduce public expenditures. These concerns are 
particularly stringent in the European fuel markets, as fuel taxes account both for a large 
share of the retail price in many countries (particularly in Italy, where taxes represent 
about 50% of the final consumer retail price), and for a nontrivial share of government’s 
budget revenues (about 4-5% of total revenues), and finance both Central government 
and Local (i.e. Regional) governments expenditures. 
Concerns on the impact of sterilization policies aimed at keeping prices at a constant 
level are likely to arise also for the industrial structure of these markets, a particularly 
acute problem in Italy. The price of fuels has been traditionally regulated by public 3 
bodies. However, since 1994 a complete liberalization of prices for gasoline and motor 
diesel allowed the suppliers operating in the Italian market to freely set their prices 
according to the international crude oil price and their operating costs (including 
distribution costs, retailers’ margins, ...). The final consumers’ price for fuels is set by 
the retailers, while distributors often suggest a “recommended” retail price for gasoline 
and motor diesel. On several occasions, the Italian Antitrust Authority has investigated 
the structure and the conduct of the companies operating in this industry. A number of 
facts have been established (see AGCM, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2006, 2007). First, the fuel 
market is highly vertically integrated, with a structure of the industry characterized by 
three main stages: upstream refiners, wholesale distributors, and downstream retailers. 
Vertical controls can take different forms: the most common is vertical integration, 
where the same company owns and operates refineries and retail outlets. But also other 
forms of market restrictions are present, like contractual agreements that impose where 
and from whom the retailers have to purchase wholesale fuels. Second, the market is 
highly concentrated and, given the high degree of vertical integration, the same 
companies are leaders in all three stages of the industry. The market leader is ENI 
(partly owned by the Italian Government), with a market share around 30% in 2006. 
The market share of the first three companies (CR3 for ENI, Esso and Kuwait) amounts 
to 50.5% in 2006. Third, the network of retailers has some peculiar characteristics that 
differentiate Italy from the other main European countries. About two thirds of the 
retailers are refiner-owned stations, usually operated by a leasee-dealer,  under a 
franchising arrangement (see Borenstein and Bushnell, 2005). Unlike other European 
countries, the number of gas stations is high, both in absolute and relative terms; they 
are small in size and the share of unbranded independent stations (i.e., non refiner-
owned, such as, for instance, those owned by large distribution chains) is close to zero. 
The main consequence of this fragmented and concentrated structure at the retail stage 
is the likely presence of some inefficiencies, like unexploited scale economies. Finally, 
in a couple of instances the Italian Antitrust Authority (AGCM, 2000 and 2006) 
established the presence of collusive conduct by the major companies in the industry 
aimed at controlling final consumer’ prices. As the story goes, the fines levied on 
refiners by the Italian Antitrust Authority in 2000 were finally removed after the appeal 
to the Administrative Court by the sanctioned companies. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the current debate on sterilization policies, 4 
by providing some insights on the possible effects of government strategies aimed at 
mitigating the impact of oil price peaks. We concentrate on the role of fuel specific 
taxes and estimate several reduced-form specifications considering as a dependent 
variable the equilibrium wholesale prices observed for both gasoline and motor diesel 
markets in Italy. Depending on the adopted specification and on the sub-period being 
considered, our results show that a 1% increase in oil price implies an increase of 
wholesale gasoline and diesel prices ranging from 0.1% to 0.5%. We also evaluate the 
incidence of specific taxes. Again depending on the chosen specification, we estimate 
that a 1% increase in the specific tax on gasoline is found to reduce wholesale gasoline 
price by 0.5% – 2.7%. For motor diesel, the effect of a 1% increase in the specific tax 
corresponds to a reduction in wholesale prices ranging between 0.6% and 2%. We 
finally simulate the impact on wholesale prices of a sterilization policy that makes 
specific taxes react to oil price increase. In particular, we assess both the effects of a 
one-to-one reduction of specific taxes in response to oil price increase, and a 
sterilization policy that considers the equivalence ratio between crude oil and refined 
fuels. Our evidence points to a positive impact of such a fiscal policy on fuel wholesale 
prices. In other words, no government policy would guarantee wholesale prices for 
gasoline and motor diesel lower by around 1% - 9.5%, depending on the adopted 
specification. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: next section provides a conceptual 
framework and reviews the relevant literature on fuel taxes and oil prices, while in 
section 3 the data and the descriptive statistics are presented. Section 4 describes the 
empirical strategy and the main results from model estimation. We then discuss the 
incidence of specific taxes on gasoline and motor diesel wholesale prices and the 
implications of fiscal policies aimed at offsetting the impact of oil price increases. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Conceptual framework and literature review 
While a large empirical literature exists on the determinants of gasoline prices and the 
way they react to changes in oil price (e.g., among the others, Borenstein et al., 1997; 
Borenstein and Shepard, 2002; Galeotti et al., 2003; Wlazlowski et al., 2009), only a 5 
scant number of studies consider the effects of fuel price taxation
1. Moreover, almost all 
contributions focus on the U.S. gasoline market, while we consider both gasoline and 
motor diesel markets in a European country. To understand how fuel taxation can 
influence equilibrium prices in fuel markets and interpret available results in the 
literature, it is useful to sketch a conceptual framework. We borrow from Hamilton 
(1999), who presents a discussion encompassing different market structures. Let P(Y) = 
p(Y) - t(Y,θ) be the net price for producers, Y the level of output, p the gross price, and t 
the tax schedule (with θ identifying a fiscal policy parameter). We are interested in 
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If the tax schedule is output elastic (which hints at an elastic demand schedule), then 
Hamilton (1999) shows that dY/dθ > 0 and net price P for producers reduces after a tax 
increase; on the contrary, if the tax schedule is output inelastic, then dY/dθ < 0 and net 
price P increases following an increase in the tax rates. These results hold for different 
market structures, and show that pass-through of taxes is related to demand elasticity. 
Given this theoretical result and a demand for fuel products rather inelastic
2, it is 
unsurprising that most studies find that specific taxes are passed-through to a large 
                                                 
1   For a comprehensive review of theoretical issues on tax incidence see Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).   
2   Gasoline demand studies are copious. Most econometric estimates show that the short-run price and 
income elasticities are very small, while long-run responsiveness is much greater. In particular, Dahl and 
Sterner (1991) find in their survey that the average short run price elasticity is -0.26, while Baltagi and 
Griffin (1997) find large variability across OECD countries and average price elasticities range between -
0.1 and -0.3, depending on the considered specification. Similarly Kayser (2000) estimating a gasoline 
demand function at the household level, finds short run price elasticities close to zero. 6 
extent to final consumers. Chouinard and Perloff (2004) study the incidence of Federal 
and State specific gasoline taxes in the U.S. market. They exploit a monthly panel 
dataset covering the 48 mainland states and the District of Columbia from March 1989 
through June 1997. They observe both wholesale and retail gasoline prices and estimate 
a reduced-form price equation, where gasoline prices are explained by a set of demand 
side and supply side variables, like consumers’ income, vehicles per capita, oil prices, 
market power and taxes. They find that while federal specific taxes are paid by both 
consumers and wholesalers by approximately the same share, state specific taxes’ 
burden falls almost exclusively on consumers. The consumer incidence is much smaller 
in the larger states than in smaller ones. The main explanation for these findings is that 
the residual supply elasticity (affecting tax incidence) is greater for state than for federal 
taxes, and greater for small rather than for large states. In a related paper, Chouinard and 
Perloff (2007) consider also the incidence of state ad valorem taxes. Using the same 
dataset and a similar estimation strategy, they find that the burden of the federal specific 
tax is not equally shared between consumers and wholesalers: while consumers pay 
about three quarters of the tax, wholesalers pay for the remaining one quarter. Almost 
the entire incidence of a state specific tax falls on consumers, while a 1% increase in 
state ad valorem tax results in a 1.26% increase in retail gasoline price, but it generates 
almost no effect on the wholesale price.  
Alm et al. (2009) study the incidence of state excise taxes in the U.S. retail gasoline 
market. They observe monthly retail prices in all 50 states over the period 1984-1999. 
Exploiting variation across states in the timing of tax changes, they investigate how 
taxes affect gasoline prices. The main finding is a complete shifting of gasoline taxes to 
final consumers, so that interstate differences in gasoline prices fully reflect interstate 
differences in gasoline taxes, once one controls for other factors that may affect gasoline 
prices, like crude oil prices. 
Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) study the incidence of gasoline state sales taxes using 
very detailed data on daily gasoline prices at the station level in the U.S. They estimate 
a reduced-form price equation, where gasoline prices are regressed against a number of 
demand-side and cost-side variables. Exploiting a temporary tax moratorium in two 
states during spring 2000, the authors are able to assess gasoline price responses to 
changes in tax rates. Their results suggest that about 70% of tax reduction is passed on 
to consumers in the form of lower prices. However, when the tax is reinstated, retail 7 
prices increase by 80-100%. 
Overall, then, as already emphasised above, the available evidence suggests that – at 
least in the U.S. – there is a large pass-through of specific taxes to final consumers. In 
the following sections, we provide first evidence for the Italian fuel market by 
concentrating on the impact of specific taxes on net wholesale prices. 
3. Data and descriptive evidence 
The main data source is the Bollettino Petrolifero (Oil Bulletin) published by the Italian 
Department for Economic Development. We collect data for three products: gasoline 
(unleaded and octave rating equal to 95 RON gasoline), motor diesel, and crude oil. 
Gasoline and motor diesel represent the main motor vehicles fuels. Over our observed 
period, gasoline average monthly sales amount to approximately 1 million tonnes, while 
diesel monthly average sales are much larger, reaching 1.8 million tonnes. For gasoline 
and motor diesel, we gather monthly data on wholesale prices and the specific taxes 
over the period January 1996 – December 2007, leading to time series of 144 
observations each. We also obtain monthly C.I.F. (cost, insurance, and freight) crude oil 
prices for the same time period. 
The fuel industry being analyzed is characterized by a vertical structure involving three 
groups of  actors: refiners, wholesale distributors, and downstream retailers. Refiners 
transform crude oil into petroleum products. Distributors receive petroleum products at 
their wholesale terminals and manage the distribution service to the gas stations. Finally, 
retailers sell products to final consumers. We concentrate on the segment where fuels (in 
our case unleaded gasoline and motor diesel) are delivered from the wholesale terminals 
to the retailers. The net wholesale price P we observe is defined as the price at which 
products are sold to the retailers: they do not include taxes (specific tax t
S and sale tax 
t
V) and retailers’ profits, that are incorporated in the retail price p to consumers. This 
price P is then the equilibrium price in the market where distributors and retailers meet 
and includes distributors’ profit margins, but it is net of specific and ad valorem taxes. 
Table 1 reports some summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical models. 
Wholesale prices for gasoline and diesel average 396 Euro and 393 Euro per 1000 litres, 
respectively. Diesel prices show some higher volatility than gasoline prices, but they are 
strongly correlated (correlation coefficient 0.96). Specific taxes amount on average to 
615 Euro per 1000 litres for gasoline and 452 Euro per 1000 litres for motor diesel; they 8 
are lower for motor diesel over the whole sample period. On average, the tax is about 
1.6 times the observed gasoline price. For diesel, the specific tax amounts to 1.2 times 
the wholesale price. These figures are comparable to those from other Western 
European countries, where the burden of specific taxes on fuel prices approximately 
ranges between 0.9 (e.g., in Spain) and 1.6 (e.g., in the UK)
3. Besides specific taxes, ad 
valorem taxes (VAT) contribute to increase gross prices, but they are not considered 
here since they show no variability across our sample period. The price of crude oil 
shows a very high variability, and it trends upwards throughout the whole period. On 
average, crude oil price over the twelve years is about 253 Euro per 1000 litres, and the 
standard deviation is 164.  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the behaviour of gasoline and motor diesel prices together 
with crude oil price and specific tax over the observed time span from January 1996 to 
December 2007
4. A number of interesting features stand out from the figures. As noted 
above, oil price increased over the observed time period and wholesale prices closely 
followed its behaviour. Starting from the beginning of 2007, however, the explosive 
growth of oil prices was only partially followed by wholesale prices. If we interpret the 
distance between the oil price and the wholesale price as a proxy for refiners and 
distributors margins (that seems plausible given the high degree of vertical integration 
and vertical restrictions existing in the Italian industry), it seems that they reduced over 
time
5. We argue that an important role in shaping this reduction was played by the 
Italian Antitrust Authority. In 1999, the Italian Antitrust Authority started an inspection 
process at the premises of the companies operating in the distribution of fuels in the 
Italian market. In 2000 the scrutiny process ended, and the main companies were fined 
for running a price cartel. Even if the fines were removed by the Administrative Court 
in 2001, the Italian Antitrust Authority started other investigations on the fuels 
companies (in 2005 and 2007). The fear of investigations and fines may have 
contributed to the reductions in the fuel price – oil price margins over the period. 
Figures 1 and 2 also allow us to distinguish three main phases in the evolution of prices. 
In the first period (from the beginning of our sample till approximately the end of 
                                                 
3   According to data relative to the second semester of 2006 provided by Eurostat, database on Petroleum 
products. 
4   All monetary amounts are deflated using the monthly consumer price index (base month: December 
2007). 
5   Actually the measurement units are different: wholesale prices refer to 1000 litres of gasoline (or 
diesel), while oil prices refer to 1000 litres of oil.  9 
1998), prices were relatively low and stable and they also tended to decrease from the 
end of 1997. In the second phase, during 1999 and 2000, prices increased and then 
suddenly decreased during 2001, reaching a quite stable level during 2002 and 2003. 
Finally, starting from 2004, prices steadily increased. In the meanwhile, specific taxes 
constantly  and  slowly  diminished. This  behaviour of  our  series will be taken into 
account in the following empirical analysis, where we need to discuss the possible 
presence of structural breaks, by testing parameter stability in the estimated price 
equations. 
To enrich our understanding of the industry, following the literature, we also collect 
information on the structure of the demand and supply of petroleum products. First, we 
consider the market share of the industry leader, ENI, whose main shareholder is the 
Italian Government. Given the high degree of vertical integration, ENI is actually 
market leader in all three segments of the market: refinery, distribution, and retail sales. 
The figures displayed in table 1 (and the variable adopted in the estimated specification) 
refer to the share in the retail market (as stated by ENI in its annual Fact Book). The 
average annual share amounts to 38% but it decreased over time, also as a consequence 
of the divestiture of one of its main branches (IP – Italiana Petroli, acquired by API in 
2005) and reached its lowest value (29%) in 2007. Second, we consider a set of 
variables informative on the size of the demand side of the market. Distributors sell 
gasoline and motor diesel to retailers and an important feature of the retailers is the 
number of gas stations observed in the country. Data on the yearly number of gas 
stations distributed over the Italian road network comes from Unione Petrolifera (De 
Simone, 2008), the nationwide trade organization which associates the major Italian 
petroleum companies: on average, 20,000 gas stations (selling both gasoline and motor 
diesel) are operating, and their number is quite stable over time. 
The total number of registered vehicles is also introduced in some specifications of our 
price model. Data are obtained from the annual report (Annuario statistico) elaborated 
by ACI (Italian Automobile Club), a non-profit public institution that represents drivers’ 
interests and manages the Italian Register of Vehicles. On average, there are about 42 
million vehicles corresponding to approximately 727 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants. 
Both the absolute and the relative number of vehicles increased over time, and this 
evidence characterises Italy as the country with the largest number of vehicles (per 10 
inhabitants) in Europe
6. Finally we consider the share of population over 65 years old. 
This variable allows us to control for any change in preferences and habits over the 
observed period, as population ageing more and more shapes the structure of Italian 
consumers. The average yearly share of people over 65 is 19% of the whole Italian 
population, and it sharply increased over time. In one specification we also include 
quarterly per capita Gross Domestic Product, as an additional demand side determinant 
of prices. Its average value is 6,157 Euro per capita per quarter.   
4. Econometric analysis 
4.1. Empirical strategy 
Our aim is to study the relationship between wholesale gasoline and motor diesel prices, 
on one side, and oil prices and specific taxes, on the other side. From an econometric 
perspective, two options are feasible to us: the implementation of a structural model or 
the estimation of a reduced-form specification. The estimation of a structural model 
requires the formalization of the characteristics of both the demand and the supply. On 
the demand side (here represented by gasoline and motor diesel retailers), we need to 
observe market prices (P), total quantities (Q) and other exogenous demand shifters Z, 
so that  ). , ( Z P D Q =  On the supply side, represented by petroleum product wholesalers, 
two sets of assumptions are needed: the strategic game played by the competitors and 
the structure of marginal costs (see Chouinard and Perloff, 2007). Let W be exogenous 
cost shifters and Λ exogenous market power shifters; we can then express marginal 
costs as  ) (W C MC =  and market power as  ) (Λ M MP = . We decided to estimate a 
reduced-form specification – i.e. pricing equations where equilibrium prices are 
functions of exogenous demand, cost and market power shifters  ) , , ( Λ W Z h P =  – for at 
least two reasons. First, we lack variation in our data. While the dependent variables and 
the main regressors (specific tax and oil price) vary monthly, most of the other 
exogenous shifters display only annual variation. Second, for the identification of a full 
structural model, observations over other dimensions would be ideal: either spatial (e.g. 
region level) or firm level (e.g. prices and quantities associated to each single supplier).    
We consider the following multiple time-series model: 
                                                 
6   In 2004, the number of vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants amounts to 597 in France, 625 in Germany, 577 
in Spain and 530 in UK (source ACI, Annuario statistico 2007). 11 
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where the wholesale prices of gasoline (PGAS) and diesel (PDIES) are simultaneously 
regressed on a set of independent variables. TAX is the specific tax, different for gasoline 
(TAXGAS) and motor diesel (TAXDIES), POIL is the C.I.F. crude oil price, while X is a 
vector collecting a set of additional covariates that we introduce to control for demand 
side and supply side factors that are common to both products. In all specifications we 
also include a set of monthly dummy variables, to capture seasonal effects in wholesale 
prices. With respect to the error terms, we assume that they are uncorrelated to the set of 
included regressors, while the contemporaneous errors can be correlated. We estimate 
the system of two equations in [4] by Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) estimator. The main advantage from this empirical strategy is a gain in efficiency 
with respect to the estimation of separate equations (see Creel and Farell, 1996). 
Before the estimation, all variables are transformed in natural logarithm, so as to allow 
for nonlinear relationships between fuel prices and the regressors. Such a transformation 
constraints price elasticities to be constant over time. However, we find this not to be a 
major problem in our data as results are basically unaltered when variables are 
considered in absolute terms. Moreover, in some specifications we mitigate this strong 
assumption by interacting some variables with a set of time-specific dummies.  
4.2. Estimation results 
Table 2 presents the first set of estimation results. MODEL 1 refers to gasoline equation 
and motor diesel equation, respectively, and shows parameter estimates from our baseline 
specification that includes only specific tax and oil price as explanatory variables. The 
coefficients for specific taxation are negatively signed and statistically significant. As 
expected, oil price positively and significantly affects the wholesale prices for the two 
products. Coefficients’ magnitudes are comparable across the equations. A one percent 
increase in specific tax decreases gasoline wholesale price by about 0.54% and motor 
diesel wholesale price by 0.60%, while a one percent increase in oil price rises gasoline 
and motor diesel prices by about 0.29% and 0.40%, respectively. 
Given the price movements as highlighted in figures 1 and 2, we suspect the presence of 
some structural breaks, that we ascertain by Chow breakpoint test and CUSUM tests 12 
(sum of recursive residual test; see Brown et al., 1975). These tests suggest the presence 
of parameter instability in the equation during the sample period. In particular, it is 
possible to single out two breakpoints: one at the beginning of 2001, the other at the 
beginning of 2004. Under the heading MODEL 2 in table 2 we report estimation results 
from our two baseline equations, where specific tax and oil price are interacted with a 
set of three dummy variables, one for each of the three periods characterizing our 
sample.  TAX_T1, TAX_T2 and TAX_T3 are obtained by interacting the variable for 
specific tax (TAX) with the dummy T1 for the first period (equal to one for observations 
from January 1996 to December 2000), the dummy T2 for the second period (equal to 
one for observations from January 2001 to December 2003), and the dummy T3 for the 
third period (from January 2004 to December 2007), respectively. Similarly, the variable 
for oil price (POIL) is interacted with the same set of dummy variables, obtaining 
POIL_T1, POIL_T2, and POIL_T3. All the interacted variables have the expected sign 
and are statistically significant. More interestingly, the coefficients are different across 
periods: a Wald test on the equality of the coefficients for specific tax and oil price is 
rejected for both the gasoline and the motor diesel equations. Tax and oil elasticities are 
larger than those from the pooled specification of MODEL 1. Moreover, they sharply 
decreased during the second period (2001-2003), to return to original values in the last 
interval. The trend in the coefficients is likely to be associated to the scrutiny by the 
Italian Antitrust Authority, which was particularly severe at the beginning of 2000’s. The 
reduction in price elasticities in the second time period, especially with respect to oil 
price, may signal a change in the conduct by distributors that were under investigation 
(and successively fined) by the Italian Antitrust Authority for the potential presence of a 
price cartel. 
Table 3 reports a series of additional specifications that consider the role of demand side 
and supply side factors. In the first two columns of table 3 we include the market share 
of the leader distributor in the Italian fuel industry (MODEL  3). We introduce the 
LEADER variable in both price equations. Products’ elasticities with respect to the 
specific tax become higher for both gasoline and motor diesel, supporting again the 
hypothesis of the existence of some structural breaks over the observed period (the 
hypothesis of equality is still rejected by the data). The coefficients on leader market 
share (LEADER) are found to be positively signed in the gasoline equation while it is 
not significant at conventional statistical levels in the diesel equation. The evidence 13 
suggests that higher industry concentration turns out to actually rise wholesale prices, 
especially those of gasoline. The increase in magnitude for the estimated parameters for 
specific tax and oil price may be the result of a better specification of the model. 
Columns three and four of table 3 present results of a model (MODEL 4) that includes the 
share of population older than 65 out of total population (POP65), the number of 
vehicles per 1000 inhabitants (VEHICLES), and the interaction between these two 
variables (POP65_VEHICLES) 
7. The coefficients on specific tax and oil price (still 
interacted with the three periods’ dummies) are similar in magnitude to our previous 
specifications and are statistically significant, lending additional credibility to our 
strategy. The coefficients for LEADER do not have the expected positive sign, probably 
because of the presence of some collinearity problem between this variable and the 
additional covariates. Conversely, the new variables are all significant and have the 
expected sign. All else equal, as the number of vehicles per capita increases, the prices 
rise. However, such a positive impact comes about at decreasing rates, for the effect of 
ageing population. Indeed, elderly people is expected to drive less and to be more price 
sensitive, and an ageing population has negative effects on petroleum products’ prices 
(working through a reduction in fuel demand). 
Finally, MODEL 5 of table 3 considers the impact on fuel prices exerted by the number of 
retailers (RETAIL) and per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Previous results for 
specific tax and oil price are confirmed, while the newly included variables RETAIL and 
GDP are positive and significant, except for GDP in the diesel equation. A one percent 
increase in the number of gas stations is found to increase gasoline and motor diesel 
prices by approximately 1.7-1.8%. This is a quite strong result that can be interpreted on 
a number of grounds. The retailers represent in our model the “consumers” of the 
distributors setting wholesale prices. It is therefore intuitive that a larger demand 
increases equilibrium prices, all else equal. For the Italian market, in particular, the 
Italian Antitrust Authority, together with many scholars (e.g. Scarpa, 2008), point out 
that the number of retailers is too high, and this causes inefficiencies and high prices to 
consumers (AGCM, 1996). These inefficiencies are even more harmful – as for price 
competition – since the industry is strongly vertically integrated and the same actors 
(refiners and distributors) control most of the retailers, through direct ownership of the 
                                                 
7   All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. 14 
stations or under a franchising arrangement. It follows that the positive impact of the 
variable RETAIL on gasoline and motor diesel prices is also due to market power that 
wholesalers enjoy as long as they control the management (i.e., the pricing) at the 
station level. The sign of GDP suggests a positive relationship between motor fuel 
prices and income, especially in the gasoline equation.  
Table 4 addresses the potential econometric issues arising from the endogeneity of our 
specific tax measure. If specific taxes co-move together with some of the unobserved 
determinants of fuel prices, the endogeneity concern may be serious. This is exactly 
what can happen in the presence of “flexible” taxation mechanism: policy makers may 
decide to decrease taxes when oil prices peaks (i.e., when wholesale fuel prices 
increase), making the tax measure simultaneously determined with our dependent 
variable. We are unaware of any explicit policy of this kind in Italy effectively 
implemented. Most changes in specific taxes over our sampled time period were 
motivated by the EU harmonization requirements of excise duty structures and rates in 
EU countries, in accordance with Council Directive 1992/81/EC (and all its successive 
modifications, as Council Directive 2003/96/EC). 
However, to address the issue of endogeneity, we estimate MODEL 1 and MODEL 2 from 
table 2 by using a three-stage least squares procedure (3SLS), where we instrument 
gasoline and diesel specific taxes using specific tax rates for ethyl alcohol, other 
alcoholic products, and beer as exogenous instrumental variables (see table 1 for some 
descriptive evidence on these variables). The first stage regressions reported in the last 
two columns of table 4 seem to support our strategy as the exogenous instrumental 
variables are relevant according to statistical significant coefficient estimates and the F-
test on the excluded instruments (see Staiger and Stock, 1997). 3SLS parameter 
estimates for oil price are always positive and significant and their magnitude is 
comparable to that from previous specifications, reproducing also the pattern of larger 
coefficients for the first and the third period (MODEL 2-IV). Estimates for specific tax 
coefficients are always lower in magnitude when compared to results from table 2. 
Moreover in the motor diesel equation the tax measure is never statistical significant. 
However Wald tests on the equality of the three period specific tax coefficients is 
rejected for both gasoline and diesel. 15 
4.3. Tax incidence 
Table 5 offers some insights on the effect of specific tax on predicted gasoline and 
motor diesel wholesale prices. Using estimation results from MODEL 1, 2, 2-IV and 5, we 
compare two sets of predicted prices: 
-  the predicted (gasoline and diesel) prices when all variables are set at their sample 
mean values,  ( ) X POIL TAX P ; ; ˆ
0 ; 
-  the predicted (gasoline and diesel) prices when all variables are set at their sample 
mean values while the tax measure is increased by one standard deviation σ, 
( ) X POIL TAX P ; ; ˆ
1 σ + : 
TAX  , POIL and  X  are the sample mean values for specific tax, oil price and any 
other regressors included in the model, respectively (see table 1 for the descriptive 
statistics). 
In table 5, the row under the heading MODEL 1 shows the percent change in predicted 
prices for gasoline and diesel as a consequence of a one standard deviation increase in 
the mean specific tax. MODEL 1 is our baseline specification, where a single coefficient 
is estimated for specific tax and oil price (first two columns of table 2) and we find that 
gasoline and motor diesel prices decrease by 2.7% and 2.9% respectively: a one 
standard deviation increase in specific tax (which amounts to about 5%) is expected to 
reduce wholesale fuel prices by about 3%. 
When we allow for differing coefficients across sub-periods, our estimated effects vary 
significantly with time periods. Under MODEL 2 (table 2), where no additional variables 
are included, and under MODEL  5 (table 3), where all the additional regressors are 
considered, tax incidence is higher for both gasoline and diesel products, while 
computations based on MODEL 2-IV are smaller. What we are considering is the impact 
of specific tax on the wholesale prices, i.e. the price the distributors charge to the 
retailers. Under MODEL 2, a one standard deviation increase in specific tax results in 
approximately a 6% wholesale gasoline price reduction in period T1 and T3, while in 
the sub-period T2 the price reduction is about 5%. For MODEL 2-IV, wholesale gasoline 
price reduction amounts to about 4% in period T1 and T3, and 3% in the sub-period T2. 
Under MODEL 5, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in specific tax produces 
even larger wholesale gasoline price reductions: around 10% in period T1 and T3, and 16 
9% in sub-period T2. For motor diesel prices results are very similar. From MODEL 2, 
price decreases by 5% in periods T1 and T3, and by 4% in sub-period T2. Under MODEL 
2-IV price reduction are 2.5% and 1% in periods T1-T3 and T2 respectively. Under 
MODEL 5, the effects are again greater: 9% decrease in motor diesel price in periods T1 
and T3 and 8% reduction in period T2. As for the differing trends, according to the 
considered period, we already referred to the likely impact of Italian Antitrust Authority 
intervention at the end of year 2000. 
4.4. Fiscal policy simulation 
As a reaction to oil price booming in recent years, the introduction of “flexible” taxation 
mechanisms on fuel products has been suggested by consumers’ associations, with 
policy makers experimenting some fiscal interventions moving towards this direction. 
Among the other suggested measures, the sterilization of the rise in oil price through a 
one-to-one reduction in fuel specific taxes seems to be one of the most popular actions 
(see, e.g., Doyle and Samphantharak, 2008, for the fiscal policy on fuel markets in some 
US States). A complete evaluation of the welfare impact (on producers, consumers, 
State and regional finances, etc) is clearly beyond the scope of the paper. Here we 
concentrate on evaluating the impact of sterilization policies on wholesale prices.  
On the supply side, tax cuts as a reaction to oil price acceleration may have ambiguous 
effects. A very simple doubt can emerge by considering the asymmetric fuel price 
responses to variations in oil price, often identified as “rockets” when oil prices go up, 
and as “feathers” when oil prices go down (e.g. Galeotti et al., 2003)
8. Our aim is just to 
give some insights on the likely effects of sterilization policies using our estimation 
results. First, in our model the supply is represented by fuel distributors, while retailers 
are the demand side of the market under scrutiny. Second, in the absence of sterilization 
measures by the government, the effects of an increase in oil price can be computed 
starting from our estimation results. All variables are in natural logarithm, so that 
estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as price elasticities. Under the simplest 
specification (MODEL 1, see table 2), a one percent increase in crude oil price brings 
                                                 
8 We experimented with a number of empirical specifications that could account for the asymmetric 
response of fuel prices to oil price changes. In particular the coefficient of a dummy that equals one when 
oil prices increase is found negative and significant suggesting some form of asymmetry. However, when 
we account for some delays in the fuel prices adjustments (i.e., lagging the dummy) we obtain a positive 
and statistical insignificant effect. In both cases, our main estimation results are unaltered.  17 
about a 0.3% increase in gasoline price and a 0.4% increase in diesel wholesale price. 
Under  MODEL 5 (the richest model, see table 3), in period T1 and period T3, a one 
percent increase in oil price causes higher gasoline and diesel prices by approximately 
0.5%, while in the middle period 2, the same magnitude drops to 0.2%. This implies 
that, depending on the adopted specification, the impact of a 1% increase in oil price 
may result in a rise in fuels’ price ranging between 0.2% and 0.5%. 
Table 6 shows the predicted effects from a sterilization policy. We present results on 
predicted gasoline and diesel prices from three model specifications under three 
possible situations
9:  
−  the predicted prices when all variables are set at their sample mean values and the 
mean oil price increases by 10 Euro, ( ) X POIL TAX P before ; 10 ; ˆ + ; 
−  the predicted prices when all variables are set at their mean values, and we subtract 
10 Euro from the mean specific tax value, as an automatic fiscal policy response to 
sterilize the oil price increase of 10 Euro, ( ) X POIL TAX Pafter ; 10 ; 10 ˆ
1   + − ; 
−  the predicted prices when all variables are set at their mean values, and we subtract 
20 Euro from the mean specific tax value, as an automatic fiscal policy response to 
sterilize the oil price increase of 10 Euro, ( ) X POIL TAX Pafter ; 10 ; 20 ˆ
2   + − .  
The last computation is motivated by the production equivalence ratio between crude oil 
and refined fuels (gasoline and diesel production). The U.S. Energy Information Agency 
reports that one barrel (42 gallons) of crude oil, when refined, yields approximately 19.6 
gallons of finished motor gasoline, corresponding approximately to a two to one ratio: 
for each two gallons of oil, it is possible to obtain one gallon of gasoline (the ratio for 
motor diesel is approximately the same). We exploit this equivalence by suggesting that 
a 10 Euro crude oil price increase should be offset by a 20 Euro specific tax decrease on 
refined fuels. 
This simulation should give insights on the expected impact of fiscal policies suggested 
in the recent debate: the creation of an automatic mechanism consisting of a reduction 
in specific taxes that exactly corresponds (in absolute terms) to the rise in oil price
10. 
                                                 
9   For monthly dummies we experimented with different strategies. Results do not qualitatively change 
and we decided to present magnitudes that are computed setting the dummy for January equal to 1, while 
all the other monthly dummies are zero. 
10 Clearly, this kind of mechanism should also work in the opposite direction, with tax recovery when the 
oil price diminishes. This brings us back to the problem of identifying the long-run equilibrium price of 18 
Our simulations point to a positive effect of the sterilization policy on fuel wholesale 
prices, which means that “sterilization” policies imply (at least partly) a direct transfer 
from the government to fuel distributors. In particular, under MODEL 1 a simultaneous 
increase in oil price by 10 Euro and a decrease in specific tax by 10 Euro
11 would result 
approximately in a 1% rise in fuel prices (computed as  ] ˆ / ) ˆ ˆ [( 1   before before after P P P − ): 
gasoline and diesel prices go up by 3.5 Euro and 5.7 Euro, respectively (i.e. 
] ˆ ˆ [ 1   before after P P − ). Otherwise stated, no intervention by the government would guarantee 
wholesale prices lower by around 1%. This figure is higher when we consider richer 
model specifications and when we concentrate on the first and third sub-periods in our 
sample. Under MODEL 5, periods T1 and T3, a 10 Euro increase in oil price and a 
contemporaneous decrease in gasoline specific tax would produce an increase in 
gasoline wholesale price by about 14 Euro (14.7 and 14.2 Euro, respectively), 
corresponding to a 3.4% rise with respect to a situation where no fiscal intervention 
follows the oil price growth. The wholesale price for motor diesel is particularly 
sensitive to specific tax and oil price changes. The wholesale price rise ranges between 
16 and 20 Euro, depending on the considered sub-period, corresponding to about 4% - 
4.6% price changes.  
A policy that would exploit the two-to-one equivalence ratio between oil and refined 
fuels, would create even larger effects. Gasoline wholesale prices would increase by 
1.8% - 7.1%, depending on the chosen specification and observational period; while 
motor diesel prices would rise by 2.8% - 9.5%. 
On the whole, price increases are quite large, especially for motor diesel and in the first 
and last time intervals of our sample. As suggested by the conceptual framework 
discussed above in Section 2, a possible explanation may be the rigidity of the demand 
function. A steeper demand curve intensifies the effects of a sterilization policy leading 
to larger suppliers’ net prices. Demand for fuels is quite rigid, and elasticity is probably 
even lower for diesel that is more often used by professional drivers, such as trucks or 
bus companies.  
                                                                                                                                               
oil. 
11  A ten Euro increase in oil price corresponds approximately to +3.96% variation (evaluated at the 
sample mean). A ten Euro decrease in gasoline specific tax is equivalent to –1.63% change, while a ten 
Euro decrease in motor diesel specific tax is about –2.21% (both evaluated at the sample mean). 19 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we study the incidence of specific taxes in the Italian fuel markets, and 
exploit theses findings to simulate the impact of fiscal policies aimed at mitigating oil 
price fluctuations. We estimate a number of reduced-form model specifications, using as 
dependent variables the equilibrium wholesale prices for gasoline and motor diesel over 
the period 1996-2007, and as regressors a set of demand side and supply side variables, 
including oil price and fuel specific tax. We then compute the effect on wholesale 
gasoline and motor diesel prices stemming from an automatic fiscal mechanism 
consisting of reductions in specific taxes matching the rise in oil price. As originated 
from the political debate following the peaks in oil price observed in recent years, the 
sterilization of oil price increase through a reduction in specific taxes seems to be one of 
the most popular measures.  
Our simulations point to a growing effect of such a sterilization policy on fuel wholesale 
prices. Stated in another way, no fiscal intervention by the government would guarantee 
wholesale prices for gasoline and motor diesel lower by approximately 1% – 9.5%, 
depending on the chosen model specification, in response to an increase in oil price 
matched with a reduction in specific taxes. This evidence supports the idea that 
“flexible” taxation mechanisms, focusing on specific tax reductions (increases) to 
compensate oil price increases (decreases), could not be a viable policy for stabilizing 
the price level in fuel markets. As suggested by our results – that hint at a strong 
potential role of Antitrust Authority in influencing price reactions – probably more 
effective policies should be focused on the supply side of these markets. Vertical 
integration, high market concentration and regulatory inefficiencies are some of the 
issues that can be successfully addressed by the policy maker in order to reduce the 
burden of excessive fuel prices on consumers. 20 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
 a 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  VAR. NAME Mean Std.  Dev. 25
th 
percentile  Median  75
th 
percentile 
Gasoline price (Euro/1000 lt.)  PGAS  395.89 85.76  326.02  381.66 464.72 
Diesel price (Euro/1000 lt.) PDIES  392.67 111.38  295.30 361.98  487.31 
Crude oil price (Euro/1000 lt.)  POIL  252.73 164.24  129.28 196.43  356.28 
Gasoline specific tax (Euro/1000 lt.)  TAXGAS  614.86 31.80  592.00  601.87 649.72 
Diesel specific tax (Euro/1000 lt.)  TAXDIES  452.13 22.93  431.86  445.16 475.07 
Market share of leader firm (%)  LEADER  38.26 6.11 33.00  38.60  43.46 
Number of retailers (10
3)  RETAIL  20.31 0.30 20.03  20.24 20.57 
Number of vehicles (10
3)    41,572.70 4,080.33  37,859.84  41,871.99 45,127.06 
Number of vehicles/population (x 1,000)  VEHICLES  726.72  48.47  683.89    742.54  765.27 
Share of population over 65 (%)  POP65 18.63  0.94  17.82  18.71  19.47 
Quarterly per capita GDP (Euro)  GDP  6,156.80 302.15 5,914.81  6,268.02  6,372.99 
Ethyl alcohol specific tax (Euro/100 lt.)  TAXALC  771.89 36.30  744.45  778.93 802.50 
Other alcoholic products specific tax (Euro/100 lt.)  TAXOTALC  60.67 5.04 56.80  59.84 62.03 
Beer specific tax (Euro/100 lt.)  TAXBEER  1.81 0.29  1.62 1.71  1.79 




Figure 1. Gasoline price, specific tax and crude oil price 
 
 
Figure 2. Motor diesel price, specific tax and crude oil price 
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Table 2. SUR estimation: dependent variables are gasoline (PGAS) and diesel (PDIES) prices
 a  
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2 
Regressor  PGAS   PDIES  PGAS   PDIES 
TAX_T1          -0.537***         -0.600***       -1.246***         -1.079*** 
    (0.19) (0.21) (0.24)  (0.27) 
TAX_T2              -1.046***        -0.793*** 
       (0.24)  (0.27) 
TAX_T3              -1.233***         -1.114*** 
       (0.24)  (0.28) 
POIL_T1          0.287***          0.395***         0.404***           0.472*** 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
POIL_T2                0.138***        0.124** 
       (0.05)  (0.06) 
POIL_T3                0.349***           0.480*** 
       (0.03)  (0.03) 
          
R
 2    0.99  0.99    0.99    0.99 







Wald test on TAX               
[p-value] 




Wald test on POIL             
[p-value] 




Monthly dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Nr. of observations   144 144 144  144 
a All variables transformed in natural logarithm. Standard errors in round brackets. 25 
Table 3. SUR estimation: dependent variables are gasoline (PGAS) and diesel (PDIES) prices
 a 
  MODEL 3  MODEL 4  MODEL 5 
Regressor  PGAS   PDIES  PGAS   PDIES  PGAS   PDIES 
TAX_T1       -2.006***        -1.258***    -2.627***       -2.124***      -2.032***      -1.965***
   (0.28)     (0.28)     (0.37)     (0.26)     (0.40)     (0.29)    
TAX_T2       -1.800***        -0.983***    -2.449***       -1.879***       -1.860***      -1.699***
   (0.28)     (0.28)     (0.36)     (0.26)     (0.40)     (0.29)    
TAX_T3       -2.035***        -1.275***    -2.693***       -2.183***      -2.077***      -1.996***
   (0.29)     (0.30)     (0.36)     (0.27)     (0.40)     (0.30)    
POIL_T1        0.385***         0.451***      0.400***        0.456***        0.431***       0.488***
   (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.03)    
POIL_T2        0.108**         0.109**        0.179***        0.174***         0.221***       0.183***
   (0.05)     (0.05)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)    
POIL_T3         0.380***         0.431***      0.466***        0.514***        0.471***        0.511***
   (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04)    
LEADER        0.287***  -0.177        -0.565***       -1.277***      -0.384***      -1.138***
   (0.11)     (0.11)     (0.13)     (0.13)     (0.15)     (0.15)    
POP65       -10.562***     -12.695***      -7.872***    -10.347***
       (1.40)     (1.37)     (1.81)     (1.82)    
VEHICLES          57.040***      59.000***      29.648**      42.912***
       (8.22)     (8.34)     (11.96)     (12.16)    
POP65_VEHICLE        -19.835***     -20.277***    -10.295**     -14.754***
       (2.92)     (2.96)     (4.19)     (4.26)    
RETAIL                1.820**        1.658** 
          (0.80)     (0.84)    
 GDP                1.134**   0.139    
          (0.49)     (0.49)    
R
 2    0.99    0.99    0.99    0.99    0.99  0.99 





































Monthly dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Nr. of observations   144 144 144  144 144 144 
a All variables transformed in natural logarithm. Standard errors in round brackets. 26 
Table 4. 3SLS estimation: dependent variables are gasoline (PGAS) and diesel (PDIES) prices. TAX 
variables are instrumented. Exogenous instruments are specific taxes on ethyl alcohol (TAXALC), 
beer (TAXBEER) and other alcoholic products (TAXOTALC)
 a 
  MODEL 1-IV  MODEL 2-IV  First-stage First-stage 
Regressor  PGAS   PDIES  PGAS   PDIES  TAX_GAS  TAX_DIES 
TAX_T1       -0.518**   -0.223         -0.838*** -0.500        
   (0.23)     (0.30)     (0.28)     (0.38)        
TAX_T2         -0.639**   -0.218        
       (0.28)     (0.38)        
TAX_T3           -0.825*** -0.513        
       (0.28)     (0.39)        
POIL_T1         0.289***       0.422***      0.424***        0.501***      -0.058***      -0.070*** 
   (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.00)     (0.00)    
POIL_T2            0.163***       0.163***     
       (0.05)     (0.06)        
POIL_T3            0.371***        0.490***     
       (0.03)     (0.03)        
TAXALC              1.796***      1.174*** 
           (0.10)     (0.13)    
TAXOTALC               -1.834***      -1.358*** 
          (0.11)     (0.14)    
TAXBEER                0.526***       0.469*** 
           (0.03)  (0.05)    
R
 2  0.99  0.99     0.99    0.99     
F-test on excluded 
instruments [p-value] 
      142.77         
[0.00] 
46.63          
[0.00] 
Wald test on TAX          
[p-value] 
    24.82    
[0.00] 
34.07         
[0.00] 
  
Wald test on POIL        
[p-value] 
    27.87       
[0.00] 
33.95         
[0.00] 
  
Monthly dummies  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Nr. of observations   144 144 144  144  144  144 
a All variables transformed in natural logarithm. Standard errors in round brackets. In model 2-IV all instrumental 
variables are interacted with the set of three dummy variables, one for each of the three periods characterizing our 
sample: T1 for the first period (equal to one for observations from January 1996 to December 2000), T2 for the second 
period (equal to one for observations from January 2001 to December 2003), and T3 for the third period (from 
January 2004 to December 2007). 27 
Table 5. Percent change in predicted wholesale gasoline and diesel 
prices from one standard deviation in specific taxes (evaluated at 
the sample mean values)
 a 
  Period T1  Period T2  Period T3 
TAXGAS     
MODEL 1  -2.673  -2.673 -2.673 
  (0.925) (0.925) (0.925) 
MODEL 2 -6.088  -5.137  -6.030 
  (1.134) (1.160) (1.142) 
MODEL 2-IV -4.139  -3.172  -4.075 
  (1.333) (1.360) (1.342) 
MODEL 5 -9.741  -8.953  -9.944 
  (1.837) (1.824) (1.822) 
TAXDIES     
MODEL 1 -2.925  -2.925  -2.925 
  (0.994) (0.994) (0.994) 
MODEL 2 -5.196  -3.846  -5.364 
  (1.264) (1.290) (1.318) 
MODEL 2-IV -2.445  -1.073  -2.508 
  (1.822) (1.849) (1.897) 
MODEL 5 -9.265  -8.063  -9.403 
 
(1.324) (1.323) (1.363) 
 
a Asymptotic standard errors in round brackets. Computations in rows named 
MODEL 1 are based on results from MODEL 1 in table 2, those in rows named 
MODEL 2 are based on MODEL 2 in table 2, those in rows named MODEL 2-IV 
are based on MODEL 2-IV in table 4 , while MODEL 5 is from table 3. Period 
T1 is from January 1996 to December 2000, Period T2 from January 2001 to 




Table 6. Policy simulation - Effects on gasoline and diesel predicted prices from two possible 
sterilization policies involving: 1] a 10 Euro decrease in the specific tax as a reaction to a 10 Euro 
increase in oil price (1-to-1 sterilization policy evaluated at the sample mean values); 2] a 20 Euro 
decrease in the specific tax as a reaction to a 10 Euro increase in oil price (2-to-1 sterilization policy 
evaluated at the sample mean values)
 a 
   Gasoline     Diesel   
MODEL 1 
        
Predicted price: no policy 
(Euro/1000 lt.) 
 
393.26    419.30 
 
   (7.95)      (8.90)   
Predicted price: 1-to-1 
sterilization (Euro/1000 lt.) 
 
 396.74        424.96 
 
   (7.93)      (8.89)   
Predicted price: 2-to-1 
sterilization (Euro/1000 lt.) 
 
400.31    430.84 
 
   (8.11)      (9.33)   
Absolute [and %] change: 1-to-1 








Absolute [and %] change: 2-to-1 








MODEL 5  Period T1  Period T2  Period T3  Period T1  Period T2  Period T3 
Predicted price: no policy 
(Euro/1000 lt.)  434.41 407.85 409.05  448.77 418.20  424.11 
 (9.49)  (11.42)  (10.90)  (10.04)  (11.90)  (11.61) 
Predicted price: 1-to-1 
sterilization (Euro/1000 lt.)  449.13 420.48 423.22  468.94 434.40  443.47 
 (10.35)  (11.15)  (12.00)  (11.21)  (11.78)  (11.91) 
Predicted price: 2-to-1 
sterilization (Euro/1000 lt.)  464.61 433.73 438.13  490.50 451.62  464.19 
  (12.07) (11.55) (13.77)  (13.30) (12.34)  (12.98) 
Absolute [and %] change: 1-to-1 













Absolute [and %] change: 2-to-1 














a Asymptotic standard errors in round brackets. Computations under headings MODEL 1 are based on results from 
MODEL 1 in table 2, those under headings MODEL 5 are from table 3. Period T1 is from January 1996 to December 
2000, Period T2 from January 2001 to December 2003, while Period T3 goes from January 2004 to December 
2007. 
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